What is the Torah’s view of religious tolerance? Is freedom of religion a Torah value? These are important questions to Jews living in Western society. In the United States in particular, these ideas are important foundations of our nation’s political philosophy and contemporary culture. Despite the many challenges posed to our community by these values, they have also afforded our own community a historically unprecedented opportunity to flourish economically and spiritually free from governmental interference. As R. Moshe Feinstein put it, the United States is medinah shel chesed – a beneficent nation. Much of the kindness that Jews have found here is a direct result of these ideas.
Not surprisingly then, contemporary Orthodox thinkers have spent considerable energy evaluating these and other modern political ideas from a Torah perspective. In his monumental Torah commentary Meshech Chochma, R. Meir Simcha Hacohen of Dvinsk (20th century Russia) presents an original analysis of this week’s parasha that reflects a belief that ‘freedom of religion’ and ‘religious tolerance’ may, indeed, be part of a Torah-based political philosophy for non-Jewish society.
When Moshe comes down from Mt. Sinai, we read (24:3) that Moshe “told the people all the words (kol divrei Hashem) of the Lord, and all the judgments (kol hamishpatim). The entire people answered in unison, saying ‘we will carry out all the words of the Lord.’” Moshe thus presented two items to the people for their consideration: “all the words of the Lord”, which Meshech Chochmah understands as specifically ‘religious’ laws, and “all the judgments”, which he understands as ‘civil’ laws. In their reply, however, the people do not mention or agree to follow “the judgments”, but only “the words of the Lord”.
The next several verses (3-7) tell us that the Jews built an altar and made offerings upon it. To seal the covenant between G-d and the people, Moshe then sprinkled blood of the offerings upon the Jews. After that sprinkling, the Jews (in verse 8) made the ‘famous’ declaration of na’aseh v’nishma, “we will listen and do everything that the Lord says” – assenting as well, notes R. Meir Simcha, to “the judgments”. He elaborates further, indicating that the intervening blood sprinkling ceremony transformed the Jews from a group of people following ‘religious’ laws as individuals, into a single national unit whose members were now mutually responsible for all of one another’s actions – both ‘religious’ and ‘civil’ – in accordance with the principle, kol Yisrael areivim zeh ba’zeh (all Jews are guarantors for one another.) In R. Meir Simcha’s words, this means that an individual Jew’s sin – either vis-à-vis G-d or vis-à-vis people – now would “damage his [or her] fellow Jew, and the entirety of the Jewish nation as a whole”, as well.
Although R. Meir Simcha does not explain how that damage occurs, R. Yehuda Cooperman – a contemporary commentator on Meshech Chochmah – suggests one possible mechanism: the sin lowers the spiritual level of the nation and G-d’s corresponding degree of protection for it as a whole, and for its individual citizens, as well.
Regardless, the implication of all this for a Jewish government based exclusively upon Torah principles is both plain and profound. Simply put, it equates the importance of a Torah government’s enforcement of ‘religious’ laws – such as kashruth, sha’atnez, or keriat sh’ma – with its enforcement of ‘civil’ laws. Just as every government enforces ‘civil’ law to rectify and punish one person’s damage to other individuals and to society at large, so too a Jewish government based exclusively on Torah law should, in principle, enforce ‘religious’ laws for they, too, damage the members of such a society.
Such an approach has obvious risks. Administered foolishly, harshly, zealously or indiscriminately, such a policy risks being intrusive and overbearing. As a result, it could also easily backfire, fostering rebellion, resentment and even additional sin instead of respectful, if sometimes begrudging, compliance with the law.
In his Laws of Yom Tov 6:21, Maimonides provides an example of how measured implementation of such a policy might work. Rambam rules that on the shalosh regalim mentioned in our parasha – Pesach, Shavuot and Sukkot – Jewish authorities must dispatch patrols to public venues such as parks, gardens, and riverbanks to ensure that holiday celebrations with alcohol do not lead to immodest sexual behavior. Similarly, he also rules that Jewish authorities must warn the people not to allow immodest mingling of the sexes even in their private homes at holiday celebrations where alcohol might lead to sexual immodesty.
Rambam’s ruling suggests that ‘religious’ enforcement should be constrained in at least four ways. First, it applies only in specific cases of elevated, communal risk: e.g., only on the shalosh regalim when, in Rambam’s vision of Yom Tov celebration, alcohol and socializing posed a heightened problem. Second, it should distinguish between public and private venues: proactive patrols monitor ‘high risk’ public domains, whereas simply moral exhortation is sufficient to discharge public responsibility regarding compliance in private homes. Third, it attends only to a major sin – sexual immorality – not every detail of halacha. Fourth, only authorized deputies enforce the law, not every local vigilante do-gooder.
These Maimonidean constraints, as well as the klal gadol (great Torah principle) of ve’ahavta le’reacha kamocha (loving one’s neighbor as oneself), suggest a way for a Jewish government based only on Torah law to enforce even ‘religious’ laws among its citizens in a firm yet effective manner. (A recent religious novel, “Murderer in the Mikdash”, by Rabbi Gidon Rothstein, illustrates with great imagination how the enforcement mechanisms of such a merciful, “strictly Torah” government might operate). Regardless, this is a vision of a government enforcing religious norms. It is distant indeed from Western ideals of religious tolerance and freedom of religion.
However, according to Meshech Chochmah, a Torah government’s enforcement of ‘religious’ law depends upon the uniquely Jewish idea of kol Yisrael areivim zeh ba’zeh. Since the Torah’s vision of a non-Jewish society operates without such principle, such a society has no business interfering in individual’s religious lives. In particular, he writes that the Noahide mitzvah of dinim (a justice system) is governed by the idea that “ein zeh me’ha’rau’i she’yitareiv echad b’mah sh’yesh l’ha’adam im kono” – it is not appropriate for one person to interfere with another person’s relation to his Creator. In short, according to the Torah, a non-Jewish government and society based upon Noahide law (or, presumably, other forms of secular or non-Jewish law) should operate with Western ideals such as religious tolerance and freedom of religion.
Having said that, there is no doubt that Meshech Chochmah would constrain that principle in various cases. Chazal, for example, expressly condemn non-Jewish tolerance of homosexual marriage. I also believe that Meshech Chochmoh’s principle would still permit a secular or Noahide government to prohibit pornography because it so clearly damages women as a class. Noahide law defines the prohibition of murder for non-Jews, as well, defining the Torah’s view for non-Jewish society regarding important contemporary issues such as end-of-life ethics, abortion, and more. There are certainly other cases, as well.
Even with those caveats, Meshech Chochmah’s words are direct, and of great consequence. In the United States, many observant Jews support ideals of religious freedom and governmental tolerance of varying religious practice because, pragmatically speaking, they are ‘good for the Jews’. On the one hand, we reason, the society we live in is religiously weak. We recognize that this is bad for society itself. We also know how such a society corrodes our own characters as we go about our daily lives in midst. On the other hand, though, long and bitter experience with religiously oppressive governments has taught us that our immediate religious needs flourish best living under a government that tolerates and accommodates our religious practices, along with the varied practices of others. Since these advantages outweigh the concerns, we support ‘freedom of religion’ and ‘religious tolerance’ as alien, secular concepts that benefit us nonetheless.
According to Meshech Chochma, however, Torah Jews can support these ideals for a non-Jewish society as a matter of principle, and not merely because they are ‘good for the Jews’ in the practical sense. Only the revealed authority of G-d’s Torah can fully obligate a society founded strictly upon its principles to interfere in the private lives of its citizens. Without that divine authority, neither a society nor its citizens should interfere in the religious lives of private individuals. To the contrary, non-Jewish society should grant freedom to its members to relate to their Creator in the differing ways they deem appropriate, and should tolerate a wide range of those varied choices unless they directly damage others.
